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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence of a “Porter effect” using firm level 
data on output and inputs from Swedish industry between 1990 and 2004. By utilizing a 
factor demand modeling approach, and specifying a profit function which has a technology 
component dependent upon firm specific effective tax on CO2, we are able to separate out 
the effect of regulatory pressure on technological progress. The results indicate that there is 
evidence of a reversed “Porter effect” in most industrial sectors, specifically energy 
intensive industries.  
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  21. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the potential effects on Swedish manufacturing 
industry in terms of input demand, output and profits of the Swedish CO2 tax regime that 
started 1991. More specifically the objective is to test the so called Porter hypothesis, i.e. 
whether environmental regulations (the right kind), that usually is associated with costs, 
triggers mechanisms that enhances efficiency and productivity that finally outweighs the 
initial cost increase. To test our hypothesis we develop an econometric partial equilibrium 
model for the Swedish industrial sector which relies on firm-level data from 1990 to 2004. 
The model deviates from the standard setting by allowing for a kind of a firm level policy 
induced technological progress in the sense that the changes in the CO2 tax is allowed to 
affect productivity through changes in technological progress.
1 Thus, given this particular 
set up the model, apart from providing standard static estimates of supply and demand 
elasticities, allows us to test for a more potential dynamic effect due to the tax effect on 
productivity.  
The background to our study can be traced back to an idea presented by a one page article 
in  Scientific American 1991 (Porter, 1991) where Michael Porter claimed that a strict 
environmental regulation of the right type may, contrary to the conventional wisdom, lead 
to an improvement in competitiveness for those firms that are subject to regulation. The 
idea was elaborated in a paper in the Journal of Economic Perspectives in 1995 (van der 
Linde and Porter, 1995). In the same issue Palmer et al. (1995) was arguing against van der 
Linde and Porter. The main argument made by van der Linde and Porter was that the 
conventional view upon the costs of regulation was too static and do not consider the 
dynamic nature of the problem. They argued that regulations have dynamic effects that may 
fully offset what they call the static cost. The reasoning behind their argument is that 
regulations forces firms to improve and increase internal as well as external efficiency, this 
through the whole change of the production cycle. Regulations will visualize and identify 
inefficiencies and hence provide solutions to them. Palmer et al. (1995) argues strongly 
                                                 
1 The seminal reference on endogenous technological change is Romer (1990). For general discussions and 
reviews on environmental policy and endogenous technical change from a national level perspective see, e.g., 
Goulder and Schneider (1999), Jaffe et al (2002), Gillingham et al (2007), or Peretto (2008).  
  3against this. Their main argument is that firms can undertake the improvements voluntarily 
whenever they want. If firms do not undertake these improvements they do not do so 
because they do not find it profitable.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we elaborate further on the 
Porter hypothesis, discussing the arguments in favor and against. We also briefly review the 
literature. In section 3 we present the model underlying the empirical analysis, whereas 
section 4 provides a description of the data. The estimation results and the tests of the 
Porter hypothesis are presented in section 5. Section 6, finally, contains some concluding 
comments and suggestions for future research. 
2. The Porter hypothesis 
As discussed above van der Linde and Porter (1995) argued that a stricter environmental 
policy do not necessarily imply losses in competitiveness. They base the hypothesis on four 
arguments. 
(1)  Regulations are signaling that there are room for efficiency and technological 
improvements. 
(2)  Regulations causes an increase in environmental awareness among firms which in 
addition to efficiency improvements triggers new ways to handle materials as well as 
product innovations.  
(3)  Regulations reduces some of the uncertainties that are related to investments. If firms 
know that they must take measures in order to comply with certain environmental 
regulations the number of alternatives will be reduced. 
(4)  Regulations put pressure not only on the firms that are subject to regulations, but also 
through the whole chain from suppliers of material and equipment to customers.  To 
support their hypothesis van der Linde and Porter referred to a number of cases where 
it seems as if tighter environmental regulations have reduced overall costs for the 
firms, and/or improved the quality of their products. The case studies referred to were 
mostly firms within the U.S. chemical industry. 
  4Palmer et al. (1995) argued against the hypothesis, and opposed strongly to the view by van 
der Linde and Porter that neoclassical economists generally had a too static mindset view 
on the costs of environmental regulations. Instead, Palmer et al. pointed at two fundamental 
differences between the Porter view and the neoclassical view. The first, according to 
Palmer et al., is that van der Linde and Porter presume that private companies 
systematically overlook profitable opportunities. Second, and perhaps more important, is 
that within the Porter view lies the presumption that the regulatory authority not only can 
identify these opportunities, but also can correct for those kind of failures.  
The articles by van der Linde and Porter and Palmer et al. have triggered substantial 
theoretical and empirical research, as well as a lively discussion of the exact meaning of the 
Porter hypothesis. Within the theoretical literature there has been a search for basic 
mechanisms that may give rise to the kind of (somewhat unclear) effects that are inherent in 
the Porter hypothesis. The empirical literature follows a number of different branches of the 
Porter hypothesis, and at best they can provide partial tests of the hypothesis. The empirical 
literature suffers from the vagueness of the Porter hypothesis as such, but also of what is 
meant by “environmental regulations” and how to measure them.   
Broadly speaking there are three different interpretations of the Porter hypothesis, all linked 
to the discussion above.  
(1)  Absolute cost reductions for the regulated firms. That is, private costs for those firms 
that are subject to regulations are reduced. This may go through different channels 
(Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001), such as improvements in internal and external 
organization which remove initial inefficiencies.  
(2)  Relative (to other firms) improvement in competitiveness. Although a regulation may 
raise cost for those who are directly regulated, it may be due to learning effects be 
more costly for those firms that are regulated later. This is what Porter denotes early-
mover-advantage (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001). 
(3)  On a national level, there may be competitiveness improvements due to an increase in 
demand for products and services complementary to environmental regulations. This 
  5The theoretical explanations that have emerged can roughly be classified within the three 
categories, or interpretations, as described above. 
(1)  Models where firms are inefficient because of bounded rationality and problems with 
co-ordination within the company (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1998, 2001). 
(2)  Models that focus learning, spillovers and other positive externalities related to 
investments and research and development (Mohr, 2002). 
(3)  Models with imperfect markets and strategic interactions (Simpson and Bradford 1996, 
Greaker 2006, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw 1999). 
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) shows that the Porter effect they derive do not 
completely offset the initial cost of the regulation (a tax), but that the trade off between 
environmental regulations and competitiveness may not, under specific assumptions, be as 
sharp as one would expect. The latter is based on very central assumptions; the first is that 
there are two firms of which one (domestic) is subject to a regulation, and the other 
(foreign) is not. This assumption simply means that the firms output decision affect the 
market price (the product is demanded in a third country). The second crucial assumption is 
that the firm’s capital stock consists of different vintages, where new ones are more 
productive and cleaner than old ones. A regulation will then provide an incentive to invest 
in a new machine. Investment in a new machine will then mean less pollution but they still 
have a cost for the investment. The higher cost, however, will due to the first assumption 
have a “scale effect” in the sense that production goes down with the consequence that the 
price of the product increases, which to some extent off set the initial cost. Simpson and 
Bradford (1996) succeed to show, under similar assumptions, that the regulated (domestic) 
firm increases its profit under the regulation scheme. But as they say; ”In our model we 
  6find that this (domestic industrial advantage) may be a theoretical possibility, but that it is 
extremely dubious as practical advice.” (Simpson and Bradford, 1996, page 296). 
Mohr (2002), on the other hand, shows that there is a possibility that the costs from a 
regulation are more than neutralized under conditions that are similar discussed above. 
However, he adds another crucial assumption concerning learning. He assumes that there 
are many firms, but that they learn from each other. This learning effect means that there is 
a positive externality related to each firm’s investment. Regulations will then internalize 
also this externality. So, one can say that this specific result - that there may exist a Porter 
effect - is driven by the assumption that there happen to be an additional externality that is 
removed as a side effect of the regulation. Another conclusion that may be drawn is that 
environmental regulations are not unique in this sense. Any regulation which causes firms 
to invest earlier will do the job. Furthermore, as is shown in Feichtinger et.al. (2005), this 
type of effect may demand a further tightening of the regulation (higher tax), which in the 
end lead to a loss in profits, hence rejecting the Porter hypothesis.  
Another type of externality is analyzed in Greaker (2006). The idea here is that regulations 
give rise to a complete new industry producing abatement equipment. A regulation will 
boost demand for abatement equipment. It is assumed that there are high fixed costs for 
developing abatement equipment, and the boost in demand implies then lower average 
costs. The lower cost of abatement equipment may then neutralize the cost for the 
downstream firm (the one that is regulated). Crucial for the result, although not sufficient, 
is that the price of abatement capital falls as a result of the regulation. The assumptions 
made may be a reasonable description of reality in the beginning of a regulation process. 
However, in time when also the competitors become regulated they can also utilize the 
lower cost capital, which in turn will lower the price on the downstream market and 
neutralize the domestic competitive advantage. Interestingly there are many similarities 
between Greaker’s model and Porter’s cluster theory (Porter, 1990) of the dynamics 
between downstream and upstream firms. 
As with the theoretical literature the empirical literature can be divided into different 
categories, testing various parts of the Porter hypothesis. The main categories are (i) those 
  7testing the effects of regulations on investments and innovation, and (ii) those testing the 
effects on efficiency and productivity. In addition there is a substantial literature on 
regulatory effect on trade and firm location (see Jaffee et al. 1995 for an overview).  
The literature on innovation effects gives no clear answers to what extent regulations 
affects innovations. Jaffee and Palmer (1997) find no evidence that the number of 
successful patents would increase in the American industry as a results of tighter 
environmental regulations, although they find that the expenditure on abatement increases 
as a result of regulations. Brunneheimer and Cohen (2003), however, find a weak 
relationship between the number of patents and regulations in the American industry. The 
latter study differs from Jaffe and Palmer in the sense that Brunneheimer and Cohen focus 
patents related to environmental innovations. Popp (2002), using a distributed lag model, 
estimates the elasticity of energy patenting activity with respect to energy prices. He finds 
that the long-run energy R&D elasticity is 0.35, and that a price increase stimulate R&D 
quickly (See also Popp 2005 for a review of the innovation effect literature). For the 
Japanese manufacturing industry, Hamamoto (2006) finds a positive relationship between 
investment in R&D and regulations. 
Concerning the effects on productivity and/or effeciency there is no clear or strong 
evidence in favor of the Porter hypothesis. On the contrary, many studies find a negative 
relation between environmental regulation and firm productivity or efficiency. Gollop and 
Roberts (1983) found that the sulfur regulations applied on American electrical utilities 
slowed down productivity growth by 43% in the 70-ties. Similar results were found in 
Smith and Sims (1985), Barbera and McConell (1990), and Gray and Shadbegian (2003). 
Berman and Bui (2001), however, find that refineries located in south California (where 
regulations are relatively stringent) have had a significantly higher productivity than 
refineries in other parts of the US. Alpay et al. (2002) find a similar result for the Mexican 
food industry. Hamamoto (2006) finds that environmental regulations have had a positive 
effect on productivity in Japanese manufacturing, via positive effects on R&D. In a study of 
small and medium sized firms within the Dutch horticulture industry Van der Vlist et al. 
(2007) finds that those firms that have engaged in voluntary agreements have become more 
  8efficient than firms that have not engaged in such agreements.
2 Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing 
(2007) sets out to measure changes in productivity in the French pig sector following the 
introduction of the European regulation addressing water pollution by nitrates from 
agriculture. They conclude that there is a “win-win” effect with regard to the Porter 
hypothesis between efficiency and regulation in the French pig sector. In a study related to 
the Porter argument, Cole and Elliot (2007), it is found that costs that arise due to 
environmental regulation do not have a statistically significant effect on employment. 
It should be pointed out that there are tremendous problems to relate the results from these 
kinds of studies to the Porter hypothesis as described above. First of all, any positive 
relationship between innovation and regulation cannot be used in favor of the Porter 
hypothesis. In fact we would certainly expect investments in R&D to increase as a result of 
regulations, but that has little to do with the Porter hypothesis. This holds true also for the 
studies testing for the relation between regulations and productivity/efficiency. A positive 
relation works in favor of the Porter hypothesis, but is not a sufficient condition for it to 
hold. Secondly, the Porter hypothesis asserts that the “right kind” of regulations may 
neutralize costs. Most of the empirical studies referred to above do not distinguish between 
different kinds of regulations. In most cases environmental regulations are approximated 
with expenditures on abatement. Van der Vlist etal. use participation in voluntary 
agreements as the regulatory variable. However, this may lead to the wrong conclusion due 
to a selection effect. It can not be ruled out that firms that decide to participate and engage 
in voluntary agreements are those firms that would invest in new technology anyway. 
To summarize; there are no clear evidence against or in favor of the Porter hypothesis. The 
main reason for this is that most studies do not test for the hypothesis as such, but rather for 
parts of it. Furthermore, mostly due to lack of data, there is no clear distinction between 
different types of regulations. Since the Porter hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
the “right kind” of regulation must be prevalent, the referred studies can hardly be used for 
a strict test.  
In this study we take the latter as a starting point. In 1991 Sweden introduced a specific tax 
                                                 
2 Efficiency means hear the distance from the production frontier. 
  9on carbon dioxide (CO2). The tax is levied on the CO2 content in fuels. Although the CO2 
tax partly replaced a general energy tax, the introduction of it meant a significant increase 
in the taxation of fossil fuels. Even though the tax rate per kilogram CO2 is in principle 
equal to all firms, the effective tax rate will differ between firms due to a specific deduction 
system which applies to certain parts of the industry or even specific firms. Thus we can 
see the Swedish CO2 tax on the industry as a suitable case study. The CO2 tax can certainly 
be viewed as “right kind” of regulation, and in addition it varies between firms and over 
time, which makes it suitable for statistical tests.      
3. The model 
In this section we derive the model that will be used in the empirical analysis. The basic 
structure of the model is based on standard microeconomic foundations, assuming that each 
firm (a) maximizes profits, (b) operates in a competitive environment, and (c) has a 
technology that transforms inputs to a single good output, but also produces a bad output in 
an efficient way. Assumption (a) implies, among other things, that given an output 
decision, each firm will choose a bundle of inputs that minimizes costs. Assumption (b) 
implies that all input and output prices are exogenous to the firm. Assumption (c) implies 
that we can describe the technology with a production function. Apart from this standard 
set-up we add a technological progress component that may shift the profit function. The 
novelty in this study is that we allow the technological progress component to be a function 
of the actual payment of carbon dioxide tax for each firm. 
To start with we assume that the technology generally can be expressed as:    
(;( , ) ) tt qf A t   x ,      (1)   
where q is output, f is the production function, and x = [xL,t, xK,t, xF,t, xE,t] is the input vector 
where sub-indices L, K, E, F denotes labor, capital, electricity, and fuel, respectively. The 
production function, f, is allowed to depend on technological progress, A, which in turn is a 
function of the CO2 tax, , and time, t. 
The “bad” output, CO2, is assumed to be produced in a fixed proportion to the input of fuel 
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3:  
, t zx F t           (2)   
Let p = [pK, pL. pF, pE] be the price vector corresponding to x. Then we can write the price 
on fuels as the price before tax plus the tax, i.e., 
,, Ft Ft t pp            (3) 
Firm profit can now be expressed as: 
,, , , ,, ,,
,, , , ,, ,,
(;(, ) )
(;(, ) )
t t t t Lt Lt Kt Kt Et Et Ft Ft
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Pf A t p x p x p x p x z
 
 
   
   
x
x 
   (4) 
From (4) we see that the tax may have two different effects; an ordinary effect on costs, and 
an effect on the technological progress. Generally, we can write the profit function as: 
  ., , , ,, ,, (,,( , ) ) m a x ( ) t t t L tL t K tK t E tE t F tF t tt PA t P f p xp xp xp x z        p   (6) 
Applying Hotelling’s lemma on equation (6) gives us then the output supply and input 
demand functions that are explicit functions of all input prices, the output price, time, and 
the CO2 tax, 
From equation (4) (or (6)) it follows that the effect on profit of a CO2 tax change can be 
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,       (7) 
where the last equality follows from equation (2). Equation (7) tells us that the effect on 
                                                 
3 Thus, any reduction of CO2 emissions can only be accomplished by a reduction in fuel 
input, which in turn can be accomplished by reducing output or increase its productivity. 
Therefore, an increase of the CO2 tax affects firm profit through a higher input price (fuel). 
By assuming a fixed proportion between fuel input and CO2 we do not have to consider the 
“multi-output” property explicitly.  
  11profit due to an increase in the CO2 tax has two effects; a direct effect, the second term, and 
an indirect effect due to technological progress, the first term on the right hand side. Thus, 
the more carbon intensive fuel is, the larger is the cost for the firm due to the first effect. 
From (7) it is clear that for a Porter effect to exist the indirect effect must be higher than the 
direct cost. 
For empirical purposes we need to specify a functional form for the profit function, (6), or 
the production function (1). Here we employ a normalized quadratic profit function
4 in 
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 The demand and supply functions can then be expressed as: 
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At t t t D t t t       

   ,    (10) 
where Dt, t = 2…, T, are time specific dummy variables. 
In the estimations we also include firm scale dummies in the profit function (four different 
                                                 
4 Here normalized by output price, P. See Lau, 1972, 1974, 1976a-b, 1978, for background of the normalized 
quadratic profit function and derivation of the elasticity formulas. For a few recent empirical applications of 
this type of profit function specification, see for example Brännlund and Lundgren, 2007, or Hammar et al, 
2008a-b. Other specifications were investigated, such as the Translog and the generalized Leontief, but the 
normalized quadratic specification was superior in terms of producing parameter estimates that generate 
theoretically plausible properties of the profit function; i.e., input own-price elasticities are negative, input 
elasticites with respect to output price are positive, output elasticity with respect to input prices are negative, 
and, output own-price elasticity is positive.  
  12sizes of firms based on number of employees) that interact with prices. This is a system of 
4+2 = 6 equations that can be estimated by using standard econometric techniques such as 
ordinary least squares (OLS), seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE), or full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) (see Green, 1993).
5 The system of equations is 
estimated for the whole manufacturing industry, the energy intensive industry, the non-
energy intensive industry, and separately for the sectors that constitutes the energy 
intensive industry. This implies that in each of the estimations technology parameters are 
allowed to fully adapt to the level of aggregation chosen, which means, e.g., that all 
parameters of the profit function can vary between sectors within the energy intensive 
sector.  
The effect on profit of a tax change can then be written as (assuming that only fossil fuel 
price is affected by the tax): 
(,)
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   (11) 
Given (8) and (9), it is now straightforward to define the demand and output elasticities as: 
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Equations (12)-(15) define the demand elasticities, the supply elasticity with respect to 
input prices, and the own price supply elasticity. From theory it follows that the own price 
                                                 
5 Below we appended an error term to each equation and estimate the whole system simultaneously. It is 
reasonable to assume that the errors between equations are correlated (simultaneity) since one shock will 
affect all equations. This is motivation enough for using SURE or FIML 
  13supply effect is positive, whereas the effect on supply from an increase in any input price is 
negative. The own price demand effect is negative, whereas the cross price effects cannot 
be determined a priori. 
It should be noted that the model derived here is based on the assumption that all inputs are 
flexible (or “non-sticky”). Among other things, this implies that the capital stock is allowed 
to adjust immediately as a result of price changes. Thus, the model may be viewed as a long 
run model. 
4. Data 
Table 1 provides an overview of the different sectors in the data set available. The data 
contains information from all firms in the manufacturing industry in Sweden (SNI10-37). 
 
Table 1. Industry branch code classification of Swedish manufacturing (SNI) according to 
Statistics Sweden. Numbers within parentheses are sectors that belong to energy intensive 
industry (base industry). 
SNI (branch code)  Description 
10+11+14  Mining industry, not iron ore (1) 
131+132  Mining industry, iron ore (2) 
15+16  Food industry  
17+18+19 Textile  industry 
201+202+203+204+205  Wood industry (3) 
2111+2112+2121+…+2124  Pulp and paper industry (4) 
22  Printing and other paper related  industry 
231+232+233+24  Chemical industry (5) 
251+252  Rubber and plastic industry (6) 
261+…+268  Stone and non-metal mineral industry (7) 
27+28  Iron and steel industry (8) 
29 Machinery  industry 
30+…+33 Electro  industry 
34  Motor vehicle industry 
35+361+…+366  Other manufacturing industry 
  1437 Recycling  industry 
 
The data set is a plant level unbalanced panel covering the years 1990 to 2004. It contains 
plants with more than five employees and includes data on output (sales), value added, 
input data on (quantities and values) labor, electricity and fuels, and gross investment 
(machinery and buildings). Capital stocks are calculated residually from other data 
available; value added, cost of capital, and salary paid to employees.
6 Assuming that value 
added is compensation to labor and capital (salaries plus capital costs), we can extract the 
capital stock residually. The data also contains detailed information on emissions of CO2 
and total payment of CO2 tax for each firm. This enables us to construct a variable for 
“effective” CO2 tax, which varies considerably across firms and sectors. 
Output price indices
7 are sector specific, and firm specific input prices are calculated from 
the costs for labor, electricity, and fuels. The calculation of the price of capital is based on 
national and industry based indices, respectively, which seems plausible considering that 
firms have limited opportunities to affect the prices for capital (global market) significantly. 
For capital cost we use the standard definition of user cost of capital,
8 which is a function 
of an investment goods index, a sector output price index, an interest rate, and capital 
depreciation rates. The depreciation rates used are 8.7 per cent for machinery and 2.9 per 
cent for buildings (the two main components of gross investments).
9 
In sum, firms produce a sector specific output, and use labor, capital, electricity, fuel, and 
road transports as inputs. Firms are faced with an output price at the sector level, but pay 
firm specific prices for labor, electricity, and fuels. Price of capital is based on sector and 
national level price indices. Regulatory pressure is represented by actual payment of CO2 
tax per kilo CO2, which differs quite significantly across firms. 
Descriptives for the cost shares for energy intensive (EI) and non-energy intensive (NEI) 
                                                 
6 Assuming that value added is VA = pLL + pKK, i.e., compensation to primary factors of production. 
7 Collected from Statistics Sweden, see producer price index section at the website www.scb.se. 
8 See for example Jorgenson (1963) or Nickell (1978) for a discussion and derivation of user cost of capital. 
9 These rates are based on estimations from Swedish industry data in King and Fullerton (1984) and Bergman 
(1996). 
  15industry are displayed in table 2, both as an average over the whole period, and for the first 
and last year in the sample. In figure 1a-b the development of the CO2 tax over time is 
portrayed in box-plots for the EI and NEI industries. 
Table 2. Cost shares for labor, capital, electricity, and fuels. Average for 1990-2004 and for 
1990 and 2004. 
 1991-2004  1991  2004 

































































   
EI = Energy intensive, NEI = non-energy intensive 
 
From table 2 we see that cost shares for the inputs used in production have not changed 
significantly during the period between 1990 and 2004. It is also obvious that the difference 
in fuel use for EI and NEI is not as significant as the difference in the use of electricity. 
Total mean energy share 1990-2004 for EI is 7% while for NEI it is 4%. 
The box-plots in figure 1 displays the variation of the effective CO2 price, both over time 
and within the energy intensive (EI) non energy intensive (NEI) industry in Sweden. It can 
be seen that the price of CO2, the effective tax, varies over time both for the EI and NEI 
part of the industry. We also see that the variation is larger in the NEI industry, and that 
there is an upward trend over time in the effective CO2 tax in the NEI industry. Further 

















































































NOBS = 35 089  
Figure 1b: Effective price on CO2, SEK/kg, 1990 price level. Energy intensive industry 
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5. Results 
The main results for the estimations are presented in table 3a-k and 4. The results in table 
3a-k displays the mean price elasticities for the Swedish industry in total, EI and NEI 
separately, and sectors within the EI industry (for sector elasticity matrices, table 3d-k, see 
appendix), evaluated at the year of 2004. Table 4 displays the estimated effect on profits, 
input demand, and production on each manufacturing sector due to a marginal change in 
the effective CO2 price.
10 
Table 3a. Mean price elasticities for the Swedish manufacturing industry, evaluated at the 
year of 2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 






























w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 35 089 (EI)+ 41 923 (NEI) 
The elasticities in table 3a show theoretically consistent signs and magnitudes that are 
reasonable, although it can be noted that the own price elasticity for electricity is 
surprisingly high. An increase in the electricity price will, for the industry as a whole, 
create a fairly large substitution away from energy to labor and capital, while the output 
will decrease to a lesser extent (in percentage points). We can also see that an increase in 
the output price will have substantial effects on electricity and fuel inputs, implying that 
                                                 
10 Detailed parameter estimates for the equation systems used to generate the elasticitiy matrices can be 
retrieved upon request from the authors. 
  18energy use is quite sensitive to increase in demand for final product. 
Table 3b. Mean price elasticities for non-energy intensive industry (NEI), evaluated at the 
year of 2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.56* -0.11* -0.01*  0.00  0.68* 
Capital, K  -0.19* -0.10* 0.04*  0.09*  0.16* 
Electricity, E  -0.24* 0.53* -0.53* -0.80* 1.04* 
Fuel, F  0.06 1.23*  -0.76*  -1.22*  0.71* 
Output, q  -0.08* -0.01* -0.01* -0.00* 0.10* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 41 923 
 
Table 3c. Mean price elasticities for energy intensive industry (EI), evaluated at the year of 
2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.54* 0.04 -0.10*  -0.28*  0.90* 
Capital, K  0.05 -0.12*  0.15* 0.01  -0.09 
Electricity, E  -0.31* 0.39* -1.03* -1.29* 2.24* 
Fuel, F  -0.34* 0.01 -0.52*  -0.49*  1.34* 
Output, q  -0.11* 0.01 -0.09*  -0.13*  0.31* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation= 35 089  
  19The elasticities in table 3b-c imply theoretically consistent signs and the magnitudes can be 
considered reasonable, except for the output-capital relationship in the EI industry, which, 
however, is not statistically significant. The electricity and fuel demand elasticities with 
respect to the output price in EI industries are relatively high in magnitude (2.24 and 1.34 
respectively), implying that energy is responding significantly to an increase in demand for 
the final product, even more than Swedish manufacturing as a whole and the NEI industry. 
Furthermore, the EI industry is relatively insensitive to price changes in fuel (0.49 for EI 
compared to 1.22 for NEI), implying that the substitution possibilities are more limited in 
the EI industry than in the NEI industry.  
Note that almost all elasticities in tables 3a-c, both own-price and cross-price, are 
statistically significant and have the a priori expected signs, implying that our empirical 
model specification is adequate from a theoretical and statistical point of view. The 
elasticities are linear functions of the technology parameters of the model, and the elasticity 
matrix is, in our view, a suitable vehicle for summarizing the results in a compact manner. 
For information and a brief discussion on elasticity estimates at sector level in the EI 
industry, consult the appendix. We now proceed to investigate the effects of the CO2 tax on 
Swedish industry. 
Table 4 displays the effect on profits, inputs, and output due to a (marginal) change in the 
effective CO2 tax. The effects are expressed as elasticities (valued at means for the period 
1990-2004), i.e. the percentage change due to a percentage change in the CO2 tax. The first 
column displays the direct tax effect due to a higher input price (the first term in equation 
(11)), whereas the second column shows the indirect effect through technical change (the 
two last terms in equation (11)). The remaining columns show the total effect on output and 
the various inputs from a change in the CO2 tax (elasticities). Thus, a significant positive 
sign in the second column would imply that a higher CO2 tax affect profits positively via 
technological progress, which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a positive 
Porter effect.  
  20Table 4. CO2 tax effects on profits, production, and input demands.  Elasticities evaluated 
at mean values 1990-2004 (t-values within parentheses). The first column, π(pf), show the 
direct effect on profits from a fuel price change. The second column, π(tax), is the indirect 
tax effect via technological change. 
























































































































































The results show that the direct tax effect, via the price, is negative for all sectors, as 
expected since it corresponds to a direct increase in costs. The tax effect via technical 
change is significantly negative for most of the sectors. An exception is the rubber and 
plastic industry in which the effect is significantly positive. Furthermore, for the mining 
(non-iron) industry it seems as if the tax has no effects on profit via technical change. 
Looking at broader aggregates, the energy intensive and the non-energy intensive 
industries, reveal that the tax effect via technical change is positive, although not significant 
different from zero, for the non energy intensive industry, whereas it is significantly 
  21negative for the energy-intensive industry. Thus it can be concluded that the necessary 
condition for a positive porter effect is fulfilled only for the rubber and plastic industry. For 
all other sectors, and the industry as a whole, we find no evidence that the CO2 tax has 
lowered the cost via productivity improvements. One explanation to this may be that 
different sectors in the industry are subject to different kind of exemptions from the tax. We 
see from table 4 that the tax elasticity is positive for the non-energy intensive industry (but 
not significant), but negative for the energy intensive. This may seem counter-intuitive at 
first glance, but may perhaps be a result of the exemptions that are more extensive for the 
energy intensive industries. In the box-plots in figure 1 it can be seen that the mean price on 
CO2, i.e. the tax, fluctuates more over time for the non-energy intensive industry. More 
importantly, the right tail of the price distribution has become larger over time for the non-
energy intensive industry, compared to the energy intensive industry. That is, more firms 
that belong to the non-energy industry have been faced with a higher CO2 price over time, 
compared to firms in the energy intensive sector. This may have led to a more significant 
cost pressure on firms that are not subject to exemptions. In summary, it may be the case 
that energy intensive industry has been more or less unaffected of increases in the nominal 
CO2 tax, whereas non energy intensive industries have not. 
It should also be stressed that the results presented do not imply that there is no positive 
productivity development in the manufacturing industry due to an increase in the CO2 tax. 
Rather they imply that the productivity development that occurs is independent or slowed 
down through the indirect tax effect. Thus a negative tax effect may be interpreted as a 
crowding out effect; i.e., a higher tax, which may or may not lead to an improvement in 
energy efficiency, is crowding out other potential productivity improvements.  
6. Discussion 
This paper investigates the existence of a “Porter effect” using firm level data on output and 
inputs from Swedish industry between 1990 and 2004. By utilizing a factor demand 
modeling approach, and specifying a profit function which has a technology component 
dependent upon firm specific effective tax on CO2, we are able to separate out the effect of 
regulatory pressure on technological progress. The results show some evidence of a 
  22reversed “Porter effect” in most industrial sectors, specifically energy intensive industries. 
One possible explanation to this finding is that a tighter regulation, in terms of a higher 
CO2 tax, crowds out productive investments. A second explanation is that the CO2 tax, due 
to extensive exemptions, has not contributed to the type of pressure that is foreseen by the 
Porter hypothesis. To some extent this is supported by a look at the data and the results. A 
third possible explanation is that the model used here does not capture the true effects. 
There are several potential reasons for the latter; (i) the CO2 tax do not fully capture the 
regulatory effect; (ii) the effect on profit goes through a different channel than what is 
assumed here; (iii) firm’s reactions to tax changes follow a dynamic adjustment path that 
are not taken into account explicitly here. 
In conclusion we can say that given the specific setup we find no support for a Porter effect. 
However, as pointed out above the setup here is rather restrictive, specifically considering 
the dynamics. It cannot be ruled out that a change in technology due to a change in the CO2 
tax takes more than one year and follow some adjustment path not captured here. Although 
there is some evidence that firms patenting activity responds relatively quickly on price 
signals (Popp, 2002), it may very well be the case that the there is a considerable time span 
between development of new technologies and the use of new and more efficient 
technologies. 
The discussion above opens up for several options concerning future research. Perhaps the 
most interesting, and important, research direction is to model the technological progress 
part as an adjustment process taking dynamics explicitly into account.  
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  27Appendix 
This appendix present elasticity estimates, tables 3d-k, for the sectors that are included in 
the energy intensive industry. We briefly comment, focusing on energy, on the estimates 
below each table. 
 
Table 3d. Mean price elasticities for the iron ore mining sector, evaluated at the year of 
2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  0.13 0.58 -0.07  -0.39  -0.25 
Capital, K  0.30 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.49 
Electricity, E  -0.21 0.31 -0.43 -0.70 1.04 
Fuel, F  -1.14 0.50 -0.63  -1.00*  2.28 
Output, q  0.03 0.12* -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 179  
 
Due to very few observations in the actual estimation of the model the statistical 
performance of the elasticity estimates for the iron ore industry are poor. However, we can 
see that the own price elasticity for fuel, which determines the size of the effect of a CO2 
tax increase, is unit elastic and statistically significant.  
 
  28Table 3e. Mean price elasticities for the mining – not iron ore - sector, evaluated at the year 
of 2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.42* -0.01  -0.03 0.40*  0.06 
Capital, K  -0.02 -0.12*  -0.16* 0.15*  0.14 
Electricity, E  -0.29 -1.15*  -1.21* 1.52  1.13 
Fuel, F  2.23* 0.57*  0.77 -1.37* 2.19* 
Output, q  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.06* 0.02 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 1300 
 
The mining sector (not iron ore) show considerable energy demand sensitivity with 
elasticity estimates -1.21 and -1.37 for electricity and fuel, respectively, which is 
significantly more elastic than labor and capital with respect to own price. Electricity and 
especially fuel is elastic with respect to changes in output price. 
  
  29Table 3f. Mean price elasticities for the wood
11 sector, evaluated at the year of 2004. 
Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.06* -0.24* 0.03*  0.00  0.26* 
Capital, K  -0.52* -0.86* -0.13* -0.12* 1.62* 
Electricity, E  0.23* -0.38* -0.39* -0.15* 0.69* 
Fuel, F  0.01* -0.18* -0.07* -0.21* 0.45* 
Output, q  -0.02* -0.07 -0.01*  -0.01* 0.12* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 3764 
 
Almost all elasticities (except two) are statistically significant. Inelastic energy demands 
imply limited substitution possibilities in case of increase in fuel price due to, e.g., a CO2 
tax. 
  
                                                 
11 Forestry is not included here, it is only firms involved in processing wood, such as sawmills. 
  30Table 3g. Mean price elasticities for the pulp and paper sector, evaluated at the year of 
2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.30* 0.26* -0.50* -0.07  0.61* 
Capital, K  0.21* -0.46* -0.07 -0.28* 0.60* 
Electricity, E  -0.79* -0.14 -0.41*  -0.26* 1.61* 
Fuel, F  -0.05 -0.22*  -0.11*  -0.16* 0.53* 
Output, q  -0.06* -0.08* -0.11* -0.09* 0.34* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 2445 
 
Same pattern as in the wood sector; significant estimates with theoretically correct signs, 
and inelastic energy demands with respect to changes in price of electricity and fuels. 
Notably, electricity use is quite sensitive to output price change. 
 
  31Table 3h. Mean price elasticities for the chemical sector, evaluated at the year of 2004. 
Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.10 0.24 0.01 -0.16 0.01 
Capital, K  0.16 -0.01  0.09* 0.00  -0.25* 
Electricity, E  0.06 0.59*  -1.03*  -0.61* 0.98 
Fuel, F  -0.37 0.01 -0.32  -0.68*  1.36* 
Output, q  -0.00 0.04* -0.02 -0.06* 0.05 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 2769 
 
The chemical sector show elasticity estimates generally in line with microeconomic 
predictions (except the output-capital estimates). Fuel is inelastic with respect to own price 
but seems sensitive (elastic) to output price change. 
 
  32Table 3i. Mean price elasticities for the rubber and plastic sector, evaluated at the year of 
2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.32* -0.09*  0.02  0.07*  0.33* 
Capital, K  -0.21* -0.32*  -0.02  0.06  0.49* 
Electricity, E  0.22 -0.08  -0.41*  -0.05 0.31 
Fuel, F  1.19* 0.45 -0.07  -1.43*  -0.14 
Output, q  -0.06* -0.04*  -0.00  0.00  0.10 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 3245 
 
The estimated fuel demand is elastic in the rubber and plastic sector and signs and 
magnitudes of the elasticities are consistent with theory to a large extent. 
 
  33Table 3j. Mean price elasticities for the stone and mineral sector, evaluated at the year of 
2004. Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.11 -0.07* -0.05  -0.12 0.36* 
Capital, K  -0.22* -0.46*  -0.07  -0.87* 1.62* 
Electricity, E  -0.39 -0.17 -0.23  -0.93*  1.72* 
Fuel, F  -0.21 -0.47*  -0.19*  -0.87* 1.74* 
Output, q  -0.07* -0.10* -0.04* -0.21* 0.42* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 3790 
 
The stone and mineral sector’s energy demand is sensitive to output demand swings, 
leading to price fluctuations for the final product, according to the associated output price 
elasticities (1.72 and 1.74). However, fuel and especially electricity are quite insensitive to 
own price changes (-0.87 and -0.23). 
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Table 3k. Mean price elasticities for the iron and steel sector, evaluated at the year of 2004. 
Standard error are computed with the delta method.  
  w r  pel p f p 
Labor, L  -0.53* -0.34*  -0.04  -0.44* 1.35* 
Capital, K  -0.57* -0.21*  -0.11  -0.28* 1.17* 
Electricity, E  -0.20 -0.32  -1.24*  -2.22*  3.99* 
Fuel, F  -1.00* -0.38* -1.03* -0.97* 3.39* 
Output, q  -0.17* -0.09* -0.10* -0.18* 0.54* 
w = labor cost per hour 
r = cost of capital 
pel = price of electricity, SEK per MWh 
pb = Price of fuels, SEK per MWh 
p = Output price, producer price index 
* = Statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
Nobs in model estimation = 14 264 
 
Demand for energy is very sensitive to changes in output price for iron and steel 
(elasticities are 3.99 and 3.39 for electricity and fuel, respectively), implying great shifts in 
energy use caused by shifts in the demand for the final product. Elasticities show, in 
general, compliance with theory. Own price elasticity for fuel is unit elastic, while 
electricity is slightly elastic.  